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ARGUMENT
THE COSTS TO DEFEND THE CLOUD NINE DEFENDANTS
SHOULD BE APPORTIONED EQUALLY BETWEEN
OHIO CASUALTY AND UNIGARD BASED ON APPLICATION
OF THE OTHER INSURANCE PROVISION AND GENERAL
PRINCIPALS OF THE DUTY TO DEFEND.
As shown by the sheer number of cases addressing the subject matter and the
differing results, the apportionment of defense and/or indemnification costs between
liability insurers and/or insureds is not an easy or exact formulaic endeavor. Rather,
apportionment of insurance coverage is a complex issue in which courts consider many
factors in determining the end result: 1) the type of underlying incident and claimed
losses involved in the case; 2) the type of coverage triggered (e.g. Coverage A bodily
injury/property damage or Coverage B personal and advertising injury); 3) the type of the
coverage being apportioned (e.g. defense versus indemnification); 4) the insurance
contract language; 5) the general duties and rights of insurer and insured; and 6) overall
principles of equity and public policy (and this is unlikely an exhaustive list of the
factors). Courts, including this Court, appear to recognize that there is not one type of
formula or method of apportionment which works for all cases, but rather certain
methods may work best in certain cases, depending upon the factual circumstances of the
case. See Sharon Steel Corp, v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, fn.22 (Utah
1997) ("We recognize that the principles set forth in this opinion may not lend

themselves to simple and straightforward application to the factual circumstances of this
case. We therefore grant considerable discretion to the trial court in devising a formula
which best reflects our decision."); see also Wooddale Builders, Inc. v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 722 N.E.2d 283, 301 (Minn. 2006) (addressing apportionment of indemnification
costs, the court stated: "our holdings here must be viewed through the lens of the facts
presented to us . . . and we emphasize that district courts must be flexible, as we have
been here, in responding to different fact situations.").
In the present case, Judge Tena Campbell of the United States District Court for
the District of Utah considered many of the foregoing factors in determining how to
apportion the costs of defense as between the parties in this case, insurers, The Ohio
Casualty Insurance Company ("Ohio Casualty") and Unigard Insurance Company
("Unigard"), and the insureds, Cloud Nine, LLC, and Easy Seat, LLC, and their members
are Defendants and Counter Claimants Rodney Ford, Blaine Ford and Rex Haddock
(collectively referred to as the "Cloud Nine Defendants"). The district court correctly
determined, "based on the plain language of the insurance policies and Utah law
regarding the scope of an insurer's duty to defend," that the defense costs should be
shared by Ohio Casualty and Unigard on an equal basis. (APLT APP, v. 13, at 2078); see
also Addendum to Unigard's Opening Brief (Exhibit "A")). In making that ruling, the
district court also correctly rejected Ohio Casualty's proffered allocation of defense costs

as between both the insurers and insureds based on months of time on the risk as being
contrary to Utah law requiring an insurer to defend covered and non-covered claims in
the same lawsuit until the insurer can limit the suit to claims outside the policy. See id.
citing Benjamin v. Arnica Mut Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, % 25, 140 P.3d 1210 ("[I]f an
insurer has a duty to defend one count of a complaint, it must defend them all."). In
answering the question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth
Circuit, Unigard respectfully request this Court to find that the district court was correct
in finding that the defense costs should be shared by Ohio Casualty and Unigard on an
equal basis based on the "equal shares'' method set forth in the Other Insurance
Provisions. Such ruling is also supported by Utah law regarding rights and obligations
among insurers and insureds and principles of equity.
A.

The Other Insurance Provision Applies To And Provides For The Method Of
Equal Sharing Of Defense Costs As Between Ohio Casualty and Unigard.
1.

The Language Of The Other Insurance Provision Does Not Temporally
Limited Its Application Solely To Circumstances In Which The
Insurance Policies Have Concurrent/Overlapping Policy Periods.

In its Opening Brief, Ohio Casualty argues that the Other Insurance Provisions
contained in its and Unigard's Insurance Policies apply in circumstances where the
insurance policies "provide concurrent liability coverage for the same loss." Ohio
Casualty's Opening Brief at 14. In making that argument, Ohio Casualty recognizes that
the term "loss" has a broad interpretation, but then claims that it is limited to

circumstances where the insurance policies have overlapping policy periods by the phrase
"we cover" immediately following the term "loss". As demonstrated in Unigard's
Opening Brief, the usually and accepted meaning of the full phrase of "loss ["damage . . .
injury"] we cover [wwto protect by means of insurance"]" is a broad, general phrase,
encompassing and applying to both circumstances of concurrent/overlapping insurance
coverage and successive/consecutive insurance coverage. See Unigard's Opening Brief
at 27-28, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Ed. 1990) at 365 and 945. The Other
Insurance Provision does not contain any language which temporally restricts or limits its
application to those losses or injuries occurring solely during the policy period, a
situation which Ohio Casualty and other courts and scholars define as "concurrent
coverage". Neither the phrase "policy period" nor the term "concurrent" is used in the
Other Insurance Provision. Nor is there any language or reference that the "loss" has to
only involve the exact same "loss" falling only within the insurers' policy period, and
cannot involve a "loss" which covers the span of more than one policy period. Ohio
Casualty narrowly construes the Other Insurance Provisions found in this case when the
language does not support such construction.
Insurers certainly know of and understand that they insure a number of risks that
involve losses caused by occurrences or offenses which are of a continuous or
progressive nature (exposure to toxic substances, environmental contamination, soil
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settlement, trade dress, unfair competition occurring within advertisements via broadcast
and websites) and such losses can span and trigger successive policy periods. Those
types of loss fall within the language of "a loss we cover" for the successive policies
involved in this case. Furthermore, those losses and the occurrence and/or offenses
which span successive policies are generally of a type or nature which cannot be easily
differentiated or divisible based on policy periods, especially at the stage in which
defense duties arise. With that knowledge, the insurers in this case each used language in
the Other Insurance Provisions of a broad nature which cover such situations of
successive other insurance and provide an equitable way to share in defense costs equally
between the insurers, which comports with the principle that an insurer owes a duty to
defend all claims alleged in a suit whether all of the claims fall in or outside coverage
under the policy. See Benjamin, 2006 UT 37, at ^ 25, 140 P.3d 1210 ("[I]f an insurer has
a duty to defend one count of a complaint, it must defend them all.").
Unigard has agreed to honor the foregoing contractual obligation it made to the
Cloud Nine Defendants within the Other Insurance Provision, as well as its other
expressed contractual obligation to defend the insureds for the entire suit. See APLT
APP v. 5 at 917 (w'We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of 'personal and advertising injury' to which this insurance
applies. We will have a right and duty to defend the insured against any 'suit' seeking

those damages."). Ohio Casualty, on the other hand, is unwilling to honor its identical
contractual obligations to the Cloud Nine Defendants, claiming that the insureds owe a
greater share of the defense costs than it does. Such resulting allocation of defense costs
is neither provided for in the language of the Insurance Policies issued to the Cloud Nine
Defendants nor is supported by Utah insurance law or principles of equity.
2.

The Caselaw and Authorities Espousing The View That Other
Insurance Provisions Only Apply To Concurrent And/Or Overlapping
Insurance Are Not Relevant When One Considers The Language Of
The Other Insurance Provisions Found In This Case.

In its Opening Brief, Ohio Casualty continues to rely upon caselaw and treatises
which espouse the view that Other Insurance Provisions apply only to concurrent
policies, but do not apply to successive policies ''because they do not insure the same risk
and would unjustly make consecutive insurers liable for damages occurring outside their
policy periods." See Ohio Casualty's Opening Brief at 16-22 and quoting E.M. Holmes,
Appleman on Insurance § 145.4[C], at 34 (2d.ed 2003). In addition to citing to cases it
previously cited to in its briefing before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Ohio
Casualty explains and relies upon a recent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court
in Boston Gas v. Century Indemnity Co., 910 N.E.2d 290,454 Mass. 337 (2009). While
the Boston Gas case is one additional case in which a court has found that the Other
Insurance provisions are not applicable to case involving the question of allocation of
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insurance among successive insurance policies, that case is very different and factually
distinguishable from the case before this Court.
First, the Boston Gas case involved a number of different first-layer excess
policies which span several policies covering the time frame of 1951-1969. For that time
frame, the parties were not able to provide to the jury or court the policy language, and
specifically the Other Insurance provision, for the policies covering the period of 1951 to
1960. The policies for the periods from 1961-1969 contained provisions addressing
Other Insurance, but such provisions are different from the Other Insurance Provisions at
issue in this case. The Other Insurance provisions contained no method of sharing, but
only contained an excess escape clause. Under those circumstances, it is not hard to
understand that the Boston Gas Court found that such provisions' language was not
helpful and "do not reflect an intention to cover losses from damage outside the policy
period." Boston Gas, 910 N.E.2d at 308. The court found that the provisions simply
reflect "a recognition of the many situations in which concurrent, not successive,
coverage would exist for the same loss." Id. As demonstrated above and in Unigard's
Opening Brief, the language of Other Insurance Provisions found in this case show an
intent on the part of the insurers to apply the provisions' method of sharing to situations
of allocation of defense costs involving primary concurrent or successive other insurance.

Second, the Boston Gas case involved the question of apportionment of
indemnification costs rather than apportionment of defense costs, as is the case at hand.
That difference is very important because an insurer's obligations and duties with respect
to indemnification are clearly limited by the insurance contract to only those damages
caused by occurrences or offenses committed during the policy period. However, an
insurer's obligations and duties with respect to defending the insured under the policy are
not tied to or limited by the policy period, nor does the law make such limitation. Rather,
an insurer under the contract and law is obligated to defend the "suit" rather than just the
claims falling within the policy period. Accordingly, again it is understandable that the
Boston Gas Court made the determination that the Other Insurance provisions only
applied to circumstances of concurrent coverage and "do not reflect an intention to cover
losses from damage outside the policy period." Id.
In the context of allocating defense costs, however, the underlying premise for
restricting the application of Other Insurance Provisions to only concurrent insurers
(unjustly making consecutive insurers liable for damages occurring outside their policies
periods) does not make sense or have relevance because the insurers' defense duties
already go beyond the bounds of only indemnifying strictly covered claims. The duty to
defend under the contract terms and under general principles of insurance law is broader

than the duty to indemnify. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,
931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 1997).
Upon considering the Other Insurance and other contractual provisions of the firstlayer excess policies, the Boston Gas Court examined the insurance policies' language in
total within the context of providing indemnification for damages occurring during long
periods of time that occurred before and after the subject insurance policies:
Further, we doubt that an objectively reasonable insured
reading the relevant policy language would expect coverage
for liability from property damage occurring outside the
policy period. Read as a whole, neither Century policy
expressly makes or implies a promise to pay one hundred per
cent of Boston Gas's liability for multi-year pollution damage
occurring decades before or after the policy period. No
reasonable policyholder could have expected that a single
one-year policy would cover all losses caused by toxic
industrial wastes released into the environment over a course
of several decades. Any reasonable insured purchasing a
series of occurrence-based policies would have understood
that each policy covered it only for property damage
occurring the policy period.
Id. at 309. The facts of this case regarding the language found within the Ohio Casualty
and Unigard Policies, the defense obligations of the insurers and the facts of the
underlying Edizone Suit, show an opposite result, that an objectively reasonable insured
reading the relevant policy language would expect that each insurer owes it a duty to
defend the entire suit whether or not all of the claims fall within the policy period and
that defense coverage should shared equally among the insurers.

3,

The Keenan Case

Just as Ohio Casualty has found an additional case in the Boston Gas decision,
which adopts the notion that Other Insurance Provisions only apply to concurrent insurers
and not successive insurers, there is an additional case since briefing before the Tenth
Circuit, in which the court rejected that notion. See Keenan Hopkins Schmidt and Stowell
Contractors, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 2009 WL 2868627 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2009), a
copy of which is appended hereto as Addendum, Exhibit "A". The Keenan case involved
claims made by an insured subcontractor for recovery of costs defending and settling a
general contractors third-party claim brought in a faulty-construction suit. The claims of
faulty construction spanned several years and triggered successive cgl insurance policies
provided by insurers Zurich (1995-1997), Travelers Indemnity and Aetna Casualty
(1997-2000) and Continental Casualty (2000-2003). Id. at *3. Keenan requested the
court to order Continental to contribute its pro-rata share as between itself and the other
insurers. Id. at * 1.
The Continental insurance policy contained an Other Insurance endorsement with
which contained language similar to the Provision involved in the case at hand, but the
Continental endorsement also contained an excess escape clause. Id. at *7. Continental
claimed that based on the language of the Other Insurance Endorsement it was only
obligated to provide excess coverage over other primary coverage available. In arguing

against Continental's claim of excess coverage, the policyholder, Keenan, asserted that
Continental's Other Insurance provision was not applicable because the policies were not
concurrent. To that argument, Judge Thomas A. Wiseman of the District Court of
Florida stated:
Keenan further argues that because Continental's
endorsement 'only deals with losses covered under its policy
period, and because there are no other concurrent primary
policies, the endorsement is inapplicable to the subject loss.
(Doc. No. 124 at 4.) This argument is unavailing. The
endorsement at issue does not concern the policy periods
covered by other insurance and is not dependent upon
whether the policies are "concurrent." Rather, by its terms
the Continental Policy states that "if other valid and
collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we
cover . . . , this insurance is excess over any other of the other
insurance . . .. " (Continental Policy at 24). There is no
dispute here that Keenan had "other valid and collectible"
"available" to it, of which in fact it availed itself. The fact
that the policy periods themselves are not overlapping is
therefore of no moment.
Id. at *9 (emphasis added). Judge Wiseman then ruled that based on the language of the
Other Insurance provision, Continental was only obligated to provide excess insurance
coverage. Id.
Unlike the Boston Gas case, the Keenan case involves an Other Insurance
Provision which includes the very language most at issue in this case with respect to
Other Insurance. The Keenan Court considered such language and correctly found that
its application was not "dependent upon whether the policies are concurrent." Id.

Unigard respectfully requests this Court to follow the reasonable analysis of the Keenan
Court1 in answering the question certified to it finding that the language of the Other
Insurance Provision in this case does not limit its application solely to circumstances of
concurrent insurance.
4.

The Language Of The Other Insurance Provision Includes The
Insurers' Intent To Share In The Duty To Defend As Between
Successive Insurers,

Lastly, Unigard recognizes the rationale of the notion that liability insurers do not
intend to provide insurance coverage for damages occurring outside the policy period.
Indeed, Unigard being an insurer, agrees with that general notion. The risk of providing
payment for damages caused by occurrences and offenses being committed outside of the
policy period is a risk to be borne by the insured, if it chooses to be uninsured, or is a risk
to be borne by another insurer in exchange for the insured's premium payment.
However, in addition to the obligation of indemnification, liability insurers
contractually agree to provide the obligation of defending an insured when a suit is filed
which alleges and seeks damages caused by an occurrence or offense committed during
the policy period. Liability insurers know that within such a suit the plaintiff may claim
conduct and/or damages which are not covered by the liability policy and/or claim that
the damages are caused by occurrences or offenses falling outside of the policy period.

Judge Wiseman's name, alone, is quite compelling.
10

Under their contractual duties, as reflected by the insurance policy and general principles
of insurance law, the insurer is obligated to defend all of the claims, covered and noncovered, as alleged by the plaintiff. In some of these circumstances, where plaintiffs
claims span policy periods two or more insurers providing consecutive policies, each
insurer owes the duty to defend the insured, and in essence, they become concurrent
insurers with respect to the duty to defend. The language of the Other Insurance
Provision includes and covers that defense obligation. The Other Insurance Provision
specifically provides: "If this insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected
unless any of the other insurance is also primary. Then, we will share with all that other
insurance by the method described in c below [which provides for contribution of equal
shares]." (APLT APP, v. 2, at 342-343 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5, at 924-925
2

Indeed, a Texas Court of Appeals has acknowledged the circumstance that consecutive
insurers can be considered or deemed concurrent insurers:
It is true that the coverage of the Alliance and ECC policies are consecutive
and do not overlap. However, it does not follow that there cannot be
concurrent coverage from consecutive policies. Black's Law Dictionaiy
defines "concurrent insurance" as "insurance under two or more similar
policies ofvarying dates and amounts" Black's Law Dictionary 803 (6r
ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Numerous claims based on events occurring
over long periods of time-such as the underlying silicosis claims in this
case-may simultaneously trigger coverage from two or more policies even
though there is no overlap in the policy dates.

Texas Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Assoc/Southwest Aggregates v. Southwest Aggregates,
Inc., 982 S. W.2d 600, 607 (Texas Ct App. 1998).

[Unigard Policy]) (emphasis added). The use of the term "obligations" denotes and
includes both the obligation to indemnify and defend, and as demonstrated previously,
the broad language of the Other Insurance Provision's first paragraph provides for its
application to all circumstances of other available insurance.
Accordingly, while the notion that liability insurers do not intend to provide
insurance coverage for damages occurring outside the policy period is sound, that notion
does not justify a limitation of the Other Insurance Provisions found in this case. The
Other Insurance Provision found in this case contains broad language which clearly
encompasses defense obligations and clearly applies to other insurance situations
involving policies which provide concurrent defense coverage for the claims alleged in
the suit, but do not have overlapping policy periods. This Court, therefore, should answer
the certified question finding that the defense costs should be allocated between Ohio
Casualty and Unigard under the equal shares method provided by the Other Insurance
Provisions contained in the Insurance Policies issued by Ohio Casualty and Unigard.
B.

Ohio Casualty's Espoused Method Of Time On The Risk Does Not Comport
With The Principles Of Equitable Apportionment As Set Forth In the Sharon
Steel Case Or The General Principles Of An Insurer's Duty To Defend.
Even if the Court answers the certified question such that it rejects the position

that the Other Insurance Provision decrees the method of apportionment in this case, it
can and should apply and analyze wCequitable principles" to answer the question of
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allocation of defense costs in this case as provided for in the decision of Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997). In conducting
that analysis, the Court should find that the district court was correct in rejecting Ohio
Casualty's espoused method of time-on-the-risk method of apportionment of defense
costs which is based on months on the risk and apportions defense costs to the Cloud
Nine Defendants. A method of months of time-on-the-risk does not, as provided for in
Sharon Steel, reflect what the insurers contracted to provide the insureds. Id. The
insurance coverage is not limited to the time in which the occurrence or offense was
committed, as espoused by Ohio Casualty, but covers both defense and indemnification
obligations based on the paid premium. If you apply the logic of Ohio Casualty's monthon-the-risk method of sharing to an occurrence/offense occurring on a single day, then
Ohio Casualty would only owe defense coverage of 1/365th ratio. That method of timeon-the-risk is clearly not equitable and does not reflect what each insurer contracted to
provide coverage to the insured.
Furthermore, Ohio Casualty's claim that the Cloud Nine Defendants should be
apportioned with 6/45ths of the defense costs does not comport with equitable principles
of apportionment as provided in the Sharon Steel case. Ohio Casualty's claim also
contravenes the general principle declared by this Court in the case of Benjamin v. Arnica
Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, 140 P.3d 1210 that insurers are "obligated to provide a

1 C

defense to the entire suit" even in cases when both covered and non-covered claims are
alleged in the suit. Id. at ^[25.
In its Opening Brief, Ohio Casualty essentially claims that the principles set forth
in Benjamin have no relevance or effect on the issue of apportionment of defense costs,
and that for all circumstances the formula set forth in Sharon Steel, including apportion
of defense costs to insureds for any period of time in which it is uninsured, applies to all
cases, no matter the differing facts involved in a case. Such claim is flawed because it
fails to recognize the overarching principle that apportionment of insurance coverage as
between and among insurers and/or insureds is not an exacting formulaic science, but
involves principles of equity (e.g. equitable subrogation) and concerns an examination of
both facts and underlying insurance law to reach the best solution. In that examination,
the statements made by this Court in the Benjamin decision are, indeed, relevant to this
case to determine the apportionment defense costs as between Ohio Casualty, Unigard
and the Cloud Nine Defendants.
In making its argument for apportionment of defense costs to the Cloud Nine
Defendants, Ohio Casualty asserts that the Cloud Nine Defendants did not join in
Unigard's argument related to the allocation of defense costs and did not oppose Ohio
Casualty's allocation arguments. Accordingly, Ohio Casualty claims that any objection
which the Cloud Nine Defendant have to allocation of defense is waived. See Ohio
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Casualty's Opening Brief at fn.2 and p. 27. Ohio Casualty is mistaken. Within their
Memorandum in Response and Joining Unigard Insurance Company's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, the Cloud Nine Defendants specifically and expressly stated that
they "agree with, join and incorporate by reference herein Unigard's Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts and Points I and II of the Argument in its Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." (APLT APP, v. 5, at 1039). Point
II of Unigard's Memorandum is entitled "THE DEFENSE OBLIGATION TO THE
CLOUD NINE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE SHARED EQUALLY BETWEEN OHIO
CASUALTY AND UNIGARD" and it contains the specific argument that the insurers
contractually commit to equal sharing under the other insurance provisions contained in
the policies issued to the Cloud Nine Defendants. (APLT APP, v. 4, at 687-689).
Accordingly, the Cloud Nine Defendants have asserted their position that the defense
obligation owed to them should be shared equally between Ohio Casualty and Unigard
and therefore oppose Ohio Casualty's claim that they are obligated to pay a portion of the
defense costs based on a months on the risk formula.
Lastly, even if the Court rejects the specific finding that the Other Insurance
Provisions governs the method of apportionment of defense costs, Unigard respectfully
urges the Court to consider that it can and should find that district court's ruling of equal
apportionment of defense costs as between Ohio Casualty and Unigard is sound and

comports with equitable principles of apportionment as applied to the facts of this case.
While it is not a time-on-the risk method of apportioning defense costs as set forth in the
Sharon Steel case, the district court's equal share of apportionment takes into account the
facts involved in this specific case (e.g. advertising injury claims of a indivisible nature,
expressed contractual obligations to defend the suit, not just claims falling within the
policy period, equal duties to defend among the insurers, and the equal share method set
forth in both insurance contracts) and bests fashions an equitable apportionment of
defense costs among the insurers.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and set forth in its Opening Brief, Appellee,
Unigard Insurance Company, respectfully requests that this Court to answer the certified
question, finding that the defense costs incurred in defending the Cloud Nine Defendants
in the Edizone Suit should be allocated between Ohio Casualty and Unigard under the
"equal shares" method based on the Other Insurance provisions contained in the Ohio
Casualty and Unigard Policies and based on general principles of insurance lawr and
equity as stated by this Court in its Sharon Steel and Benjamin decisions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6

day of December 2009.
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Florida,
Fort Myers Division.
KEENAN HOPKINS SCHMIDT AND STOWELL
CONTRACTORS, INC., a Florida corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.
No. 2:07-cv-383-FtM-34DNF.
Sept. 1,2009.
Background: Insured subcontractor brought statecourt action against commercial general liability
(CGL) insurer, seeking to recover costs of defending against and settling general contractor's thirdparty claim against insured in faulty-construction
lawsuit. Insurer removed action on diversity
grounds, and moved for summary judgment.
Holdings: The District Court, Thomas A. Wiseman
Jr., Senior District Judge sitting by designation,
held that:
(1) insurer was not prejudiced by insured's late notice of claim and could not rely on late notice to
support coverage denial;
(2) CGL policy was excess to other insurance
policies;
(3) insurer had no duty to defend, given clear superseding endorsement to that effect contained in CGL
policy;
(4) reduced-deductible endorsement that went into
effect after date when suit was filed against general
contractor did not apply; and
(5) CGL policy's known-loss exclusion was applicable.
Motion granted.
West Headnotes
[I] Insurance 217 €=>1832(1)

217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction
217k 1830 Favoring Insureds or Beneficiaries; Disfavoring Insurers
217k 1832 Ambiguity, Uncertainty or
Conflict
217kl832(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Insurance 217 €^>1836
217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction
217k 1836 k. Favoring Coverage or Indemnity; Disfavoring Forfeiture. Most Cited Cases
Insurance 217 € ^ 2 0 9 0
217 Insurance
217XV Coverage—in General
2l7k2090 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Under Florida law, coverage clauses of insurance
contract are construed in broadest possible manner
to effect greatest extent of coverage; ambiguities
are interpreted liberally in favor of insured and
strictly against insurer who prepared policy.
[21 Insurance 217 €^>1845(2)
217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction
217kl838 Materials Related or Attached
to Policies
217kl845 Margins or Backs of
Policies; Endorsements
2I7kl&45(2) k. Conflicts Between
Policies and Endorsements. Most Cited Cases
Under Florida law, to extent that insurance policy
endorsement is inconsistent with body of policy,
endorsement controls.
[3| Insurance 217 €^>3168

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

rage J of 18
Page 2
— F.Supp.2d — , 2009 WL 2868627 (M.DJFla.)
(Cite as: 2009 WL 2868627 (M.D.FIa.))
217 Insurance
217XXVII Claims and Settlement Practices
217XXVII(B) Claim Procedures
217XXVII(B)2 Notice and Proof of Loss
217k3166 Effect of Noncompliance
with Requirements
217k3168 k. Prejudice to Insurer.
Most Cited Cases
Under Florida law, insured's failure to comply with
insurance policy's mandatory provision requiring
insured to provide written notice to insurer of claim
"as soon as practicable" may negate insurer's coverage obligation, but only if insurer is actually prejudiced by such late notice.

claim sufficiently to permit it to deny claim on other grounds.

14] Insurance 217 €^>3195

[7J Insurance 217 C^>2285(5)

217 Insurance
217XXVII Claims and Settlement Practices
217XXVII(B) Claim Procedures
217XXVII(B)2 Notice and Proof of Loss
217k3193 Evidence
217k3195 k. Presumptions. Most
Cited Cases
Under Florida law, insurer is ordinarily presumed
to be prejudiced if insured provides late notice of
claim in violation of insurance policy's provisions,
but insured can rebut that presumption by introducing evidence tending to show that insurer was in
fact not prejudiced by late notice.

217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVII(A) In General
217k2279 Amounts Payable
217k2285 Other Insurance
217k2285(3) Proration and Allocation
217k2285(5) k. By Policy Limits. Most Cited Cases
Under Florida law, where two or more liability insurance policies that apparently cover same loss
contain mutually repugnant "other insurance" provisions, each insurer is liable for pro-rata share of
settlement or judgment in accordance with its
policy limits.

[5] Insurance 217 €=>3168
217 Insurance
217XXVII Claims and Settlement Practices
217XXVII(B) Claim Procedures
217XXVII(B)2 Notice and Proof of Loss
217k3166 Effect of Noncompliance
with Requirements
217k3168 k. Prejudice to Insurer.
Most Cited Cases
Under Florida law, commercial general liability
(CGL) insurer was not prejudiced by insured's allegedly late notice of claim, and thus could not rely
on late notice to support denial of coverage, given
insurer's ability, despite late notice, to investigate

[61 Insurance 217 €=>2110
217 Insurance
217XV Coverage—in General
217k2107 Other Insurance
217k2110 k. Primary and Excess Insurance, in General. Most Cited Cases
To determine whether insurance policy provides for
primary or excess coverage under Florida law,
court measures intent of parties solely by language
of policies, unless language is ambiguous.

[81 Insurance 217 €=^2285(2)
217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVII(A) In General
217k2279 Amounts Payable
217k2285 Other Insurance
217k2285(2) k. Primary and Excess
Insurance. Most Cited Cases
Under Florida law, commercial general liability
(CGL) insurance policy whose "other insurance"
clause unambiguously specified that policy was excess to any other policies covering same loss was
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excess to CGL policies whose other-insurance
clauses stated that policies were primary except as
to other insurance covering specified risks, e.g.
"your work"; fact that policy periods did not overlap did not negate excess status.
[9] Insurance 217 €^>2911
217 Insurance
217XXIII Duty to Defend
217k2911 k. In General; Nature and Source
of Duty. Most Cited Cases
Under Florida law, commercial general liability
(CGL) insurer had no duty to defend insured, even
though coverage portion of policy referenced duty
to defend, given superseding endorsement which
stated unambiguously that insurer had no such duty.
[10] Insurance 217 € ^ 2 9 1 1
217 Insurance
217XXIII Duty to Defend
217k2911 k. In General; Nature and Source
of Duty. Most Cited Cases
Under Florida law, in absence of express statutory
or contractual duty to defend, there is no such duty.
[11] Insurance 217 € ^ 2 2 6 5
217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVII(A) In General
217k2263 Commencement and Duration
of Coverage
217k2265 k. Continuous Acts and Injuries; Trigger. Most Cited Cases

"manifested" at least by date that property owner
sued general contractor for that damage, within
commercial general liability (CGL) insurance
policy's "known and continuing loss" endorsement's
definition of "manifested," i.e. "when the damage is
first discovered by the person or organization who
suffered such damage," and therefore reduceddeductible endorsement that went into effect after
that date did not apply.
[12] Insurance 217 €=>2265
217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVII(A) In General
217k2263 Commencement and Duration
of Coverage
217k2265 k. Continuous Acts and Injuries; Trigger. Most Cited Cases
Under Florida law, property damage resulting from
insured
subcontractor's
faulty
workmanship
"manifested," within meaning of commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy's known and
continuing loss exclusion applicable to damage
"that is continuous or progressively deteriorating
and which 'manifested' prior to the inception ... of
the policy period," when property owner discovered
damage; property owner did not have to attribute
loss to insured or its sub-subcontractors, or even recognize damage as "property damage" falling within policy's definition, in order to trigger exclusion.
Mark A. Boyle, Sr., Debbie Sines Crockett, Boyle
& Gentile, PA, Ft. Myers, FL, for Plaintiff.
Anthony A.B. Dogali, Jacqueline Taylor, Haley R.
Maple, Lee William Atkinson, Forizs & Dogali,
PL, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.

Insurance 217 €^>2282
217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage-Liability Insurance
217XVII(A) In General
217k2279 Amounts Payable
217k2282 k. Deductibles. Most Cited
Cases
Under Florida law, damage to property resulting
from insured subcontractor's faulty workmanship

MEMORANDUM OPINION
THOMAS A. WISEMAN, JR., Senior District
Judge Sitting by designation.
*1 Before the Court is Defendant Continental Casualty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and
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Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 89),
to which the Plaintiff has filed its Response and
Memorandum of Law in Opposition (Doc. No.
113). At the Court's request, the Defendant also
filed a reply brief (Doc. No. 124); Plaintiff, with
permission, then filed a sur-reply (Doc. No. 132).
The motion, having been amply briefed, is ripe for
consideration. Pursuant to Local Rule 3.010),
Plaintiff has requested oral argument on the motion
(Doc. No. 114), but the Court finds that oral argument would not be of assistance in resolving the
motion. That request is therefore denied.
Further, for the reasons explained below, the Court
finds that the Defendant has established that it is
entitled to summary judgment. The pending motion
will therefore be granted and this matter dismissed.

Keenan and its other insurers incurred in the Underlying Case. After removing the case to federal
court, Continental filed the present motion for summary judgment.

II. THE FACTUAL RECORD
This action arises out of disputes regarding construction defects and damages affecting Disney's
Boardwalk. On August 15, 1994, Disney contracted
with Bovis as the general contractor to build the
Boardwalk. Bovis then subcontracted with Keenan,
among other subcontractors. Schedule A to the subcontract between Keenan and Bovis lists a number
of items that Keenan was obligated to "furnish and
install," including but not limited to:
All exterior architectural trim and surrounds ....

I. INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiff, Keenan Hopkins Schmidt and Stowell
Contractors, Inc. ("Keenan"), filed suit in state
court against the Defendant, Continental Casualty
Company ("Continental"), for declaratory relief and
for damages caused by Continental's alleged breach
of its insurance contract with Keenan. This case
arises out of an earlier suit ("Underlying Case")
brought by Disney Vacation Development, Inc.
("Disney") against McDevitt Street Bovis ("Bovis")
for faulty construction of the Disney Boardwalk
(hereinafter, the "Boardwalk" or "project site").
Bovis, believing that Keenan was responsible for
some of the faulty construction that formed the
basis of Disney's complaint, impleaded Keenan into
the Underlying Case. In the present suit, Keenan
claims that it tendered the defense and requested indemnification in the Underlying Case from its insurers, including Continental, but that Continental
wrongfully refused to defend or to indemnify Keenan. Keenan now urges this Court to issue a judicial
declaration that Continental failed to abide by the
terms of the insurance contract in effect between
Continental and Keenan, and further requests that
this Court order Continental to contribute its prorata share of the legal fees and settlement costs

All exterior architectural: GFRC, Polygarde woodwork, plastic, FRP, trim....

All exterior wall and roof, metal and wood framing.
Wood framing as it applies to plywood at metal
framing and corrugated metal decks.
*2 ....

All soffits, eave, fascia, rakes, entablatures, cornices, etc., architectural elements at the envelopes of the buildings and site structures....
(Doc. 91-4, Keenan-Bovis Subcontract, at 11.)
On September 7, 1995, Lyle Painting, the painting
subcontractor, contacted Bovis regarding paint failures and delays caused by defective "wood trim."
(Doc. 91-6, 9/7/1995 Message from Lyle Painting.)
Bovis identified Keenan as the party that had installed the defective "wood trim" and then advised
Keenan that it was responsible for resolving the
problem. (Doc. 91-7, 9/18/1995 Letter from Bovis
to Keenan.)
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On October 11, 1995, Disney sent a letter to Bovis
regarding extensive water intrusion "through the
roofs, exterior facades, expansion joints, unsealed
and open slab penetrations, etc.," and stated that
"[t]he source of these problems is directly tied to
completion of the roofs and exterior facades." (Doc.
91-9, 10/11/1995 Letter from Disney to Bovis.)
This letter described the chaotic situation at the
project site and attributed much of the delay in the
completion of the roof and exterior facades to the
lack of coordination between Bovis and its many
sub-contractors, including Keenan. Disney attributed Bovis' inability to "complete the roofing and
exterior facades for this project" to a widespread
lack of "manpower" on the part of some of the subcontractors, including Keenan. (Id.) As a result of
delays in completing roofing and exterior facades,
"drywall, in-wall insulation, and wall finishes
[we]re being affected by water intrusion." (Id.)
Disney and Bovis executed a "Close-out Change
Order" on August 30, 1997 (Doc. 91-23), pursuant
to which Disney agreed to release various claims it
had against Bovis, while specifically reserving its
right to enforce the obligations contained in the
Close-Out Change Order. Attachment H to the
"Close-out Change Order" reserves in pertinent part:
\. Paint Defects-Repair or replacement of exterior
paint defects including:
i) building decorative shutters;
ii) balcony divider partitions and running trim;
iii) exterior facade (e.g.*, blistering, peeling and
premature fading).

5. Roof Leaks-Repair and replacement of areas of
roof where water penetration is occurring ....
(Doc. 91-23, at 55.) Keenan was then directed to attend a meeting with Bovis and Disney on October
27, 1997 to resolve the issues caused by the defect-

ive "paint or the wood products" supplied by Keenan's sub-contract. (See 10/21/1997 Letter from
Bovis to Keenan, Doc. 91-20 (giving notice of the
meeting with Disney and advising Keenan to send a
representative to the meeting).) A letter dated October 28, 1997 from Bovis to an attorney for Keenan
documents that Keenan failed to attend the meeting.
That letter documents Bovis' frustration with Keenan's refusal to deal with issues caused by its work:
My greater concern is the failure of Keenan Hopkins Schmidt & Stowell to attend the meeting
which we had requested they attend with the
Owner yesterday to deal with outstanding warranty items, particularly those contained in exhibit H of the close out change order.
*3 (Doc. No. 91-21.)
On June 9, 2000, Disney filed a complaint in Florida state court against Bovis, asserting claims for
breach of contract based on deficient workmanship
relating to the project. (Doc. No. 91-24, Disney
Compl.) Bovis, in turn, tendered the defense to and
demanded indemnification from Keenan on August
29, 2002. (Doc. No. 91-25.) Keenan claims that,
prior to this tender, it had no knowledge that Disney had sued Bovis. Despite the tender in 2002,
Keenan also claims that it had "no information"
that Bovis actually intended to seek damages from
Keenan until November 9, 2004, when Bovis filed a
Third-Party Complaint against Keenan in the Underlying Case for contractual indemnity, commonlaw indemnity, contribution, and breach of contract.
(Doc. No. 91-22, Bovis 3d Party Compl.) Bovis
specifically alleged that the work performed and/or
the materials provided by Keenan "caused damages
including but not limited to damages to tangible
property other than the work performed under the
subcontract from Bovis stemming from the alleged
acts and/or omissions within the scope of the work
of [Keenan]." (Doc. No. 113, at 4-5 (quoting Bovis
Compl. against Keenan in Underlying Case) .)
Bovis and Keenan settled in October 2007.
At all times relevant to this dispute, Keenan possessed insurance coverage under the following
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commercial general liability ("CGL") policies: (1) a
policy issued by the Zurich family of insurers in effect from 1995 to 1997 (hereinafter, "Zurich
Policy") (Doc. No. 112-7); (2) a policy issued by
Travelers Indemnity Company and the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company in effect from 1997
through 2000 ("Travelers Policy") (Doc. No.
112-9); and (3) a series of policies issued by Defendant Continental in effect from February 1, 2000
until October 2003 ("the Policy" or "Continental
Policy") (Doc. No. 91-3, 112-2, 112-3, 112-4,
112-5, 112-6). Without actually addressing why,
Keenan asserts that the Continental Policy in effect
from February 1, 2000 through January 1, 2001 is
the Policy that covers the loss for which Keenan
now seeks reimbursement, and that is the policy
term upon which the parties here have focused. As
discussed below, the Continental Policy covers
losses "discovered" by the injured party during the
Policy period. The Court therefore assumes that
Keenan focuses on the 2000 Policy because it is
clear that Disney, the injured party, necessarily had
knowledge of the property damage at issue no later
than June 9, 2000, the day it tiled suit against Bovis.
Each of the above-referenced policies insured
Keenan for up to $2,000,000 for "General Aggregate Limit (Other than Products-Completed Operations)," up to $2,000,000 for "Products-Completed
Operations Aggregate Limit," and $1,000,000 for
"Each Occurrence Limit." (Continental Policy at 2;
Zurich Policy at 2; Travelers Policy at 14.)
Keenan placed all of its insurers on notice of Bovis'
complaint on December 27, 2004. Continental responded on October 31, 2005 by issuing a letter to
Keenan stating that it would not provide a defense
or indemnity. (Doc. 91-33.) Keenan was ultimately
defended in the Underlying Case by Zurich and
Travelers, and these insurers collectively spent a
large sum of money in defense fees and litigation
costs in the Underlying Case. Keenan asserts that,
in addition to the sums paid out by the insurers, it
was required to pay approximately $292,480 out of

its own pocket-$ 122,980 on attorney fees and defense costs and $169,500 toward the settlement
with Bovis. The record is unclear as to exactly why
Keenan was required to pay that sum, given the
coverage limitations of the Zurich and Travelers
Policies. In any event, Keenan filed this action in
state court against Continental on June 13, 2007 to
recover the costs associated with the Underlying
Case, including a pro-rata share of the expenditures
made by Zurich and Travelers as well as the
amounts paid by Keenan. Continental subsequently
removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
*4 Continental has now filed its motion for summary judgment in which it relies primarily upon the
express terms of the Policy itself in support of its
denial of coverage in this case. Keenan, of course,
opposes the motion.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All
U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all evidence and draw all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins.
Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.2002).
However, "[t]he mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
411 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d
202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial' " and the court may grant the motion for summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380,
127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d
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538 (1986)). Conversely, if reasonable minds could
disagree on the inferences arising from the material
facts, then the court must deny the motion for summary judgment, and the case should proceed to discovery. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that the material facts underlying all the relevant legal questions raised by the pleadings are not
in dispute, or else summary judgment will be
denied. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d
1241, 1246 (11th Cir.1999); Brunswick Corp. v.
Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 611-12 (5th Cir.1967). The
nonmoving party is not required to present evidence
when responding to a motion for summary judgment unless and until the moving party itself has
properly supported the summary judgment motion
with sufficient evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d
142 (1970). Once the moving party meets this initial burden, then Rule 56(e) requires that the nonmoving party present opposing evidence; it may not
"simply rely on the contrary allegation in [its] complaint." Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160 (1970). If the nonmoving party introduces nothing more than a mere
scintilla of evidence upon the basis of which a jury
could not reasonably find for the nonmoving party,
then the motion for summary judgment should be
granted. Anderson, All U.S. at 252. Additionally,
conclusory allegations and conjecture are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and
therefore cannot serve as the basis for denying summary judgment. Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co.,
101F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996).

IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Continental raises a number of arguments in support of its assertion it is entitled to judgment in its
favor as a matter of law, including:
*5 (1) that because Keenan failed to provide timely
notice of the claims made in the Underlying Case,
its claims are now barred;

(2) that the Continental Policy provided excess coverage only and, because Keenan had primary coverage from other insurers and was actually defended
and indemnified by its primary insurers, Continental has no obligation to reimburse the other insurers
for a pro-rate share of the expenditures made in defending and settling the Underlying Case;
(3) that the Policy endorsements expressly relieved
Continental of any duty to defend Keenan in the
Underlying Suit;
(4) that the applicable deductible amount is in excess of whatever remaining amount Keenan paid
out of pocket; and
(5) alternatively, that the exclusion pertaining to
known and continuing damage completely bars recovery in this case and, even if the policy did not
contain a "known loss" provision, Keenan's claims
would be barred by the common-law doctrine of
"known loss / loss in progress."
As explained in greater detail below, the Court
finds that Continental was not prejudiced by any
late notice of Keenan's claim and therefore cannot
rely on that defense. However, the Court does find
that the Continental Policy, by its unambiguous
terms, was intended to provide excess rather than
primary insurance coverage. Consequently, Continental has no contractual obligation to reimburse
either Zurich or Travelers for any funds they spent
defending or indemnifying Keenan in the Underlying Case. With respect to the approximately
$292,480 Keenan spent "out of pocket," it remains
unclear why Keenan was required to pay that sum
and the extent to which any amount of it would
properly be reimbursable by an excess insurer. Regardless, Continental is entitled to judgment in its
favor with respect to that amount too because: (1)
the Continental Policy did not require Continental
to defend Keenan in the Underlying Case, such that
Continental has no liability for the $122,980 in attorney fees and defense costs incurred by Keenan;
and (2) the remainder, approximately $169,500, is
less than the applicable deductible amount of
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$250,000.
Having concluded that Continental is entitled to
judgment in its favor on those grounds, the Court
has no need to reach Continental's remaining arguments. Notwithstanding, the Court also finds that
Disney clearly had knowledge of the property damage at issue no later than 1997, such that Keenan's
claims as a whole are apparently barred by the
"known and continuing loss" provision in the
Policy. This finding provides an alternative basis
for summary judgment in favor of Continental.

A. Florida Law and the Interpretation of Insurance Contracts Generally
[1][2] Two countervailing impulses govern the
Court's interpretation of the insurance policy at issue. On one hand, Florida courts have long recognized the validity and enforceability of insurance
contracts as a matter of public policy, see France v.
Liberty Mut Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 1155, 1156 (Fla.3d
Dist.Ct.App.1980), pursuant to which insurance
contracts, like other contracts generally, are to be
"construed in accordance with the plain language
[thereof] as bargained for by the parties." Westmoreland v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 704 So.2d
176, 179 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1997); see also U.S.
Auto. Ass'n v. McCray, 348 So.2d 6, 8 (Fla.3d
Dist.Ct.App.1977) (noting that an insurance policy
"should be construed according to the entirety of its
terms as set forth therein and as amplified by any
endorsement thereto" (citing Fla. Stat. § 627.419
(1)). On the other hand, "Florida law is equally
well-settled that insuring or coverage clauses are
construed in the broadest possible manner to affect
the greatest extent of coverage." Westmoreland,
704 So.2d at 179. As a result, "ambiguities are interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and
strictly against the insurer who prepared the
policy." Id. But ambiguity only exists when contractual terms are "subject to opposing reasonable
interpretations." Blue Shield of Fla., Inc. v. Woodlief, 359 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App.1978)
. As both parties here recognize, the fact that a

policy endorsement contradicts a provision contained in the body of the policy will not necessarily
result in ambiguity, because, under Florida law, "to
the extent an endorsement is inconsistent with the
body of the policy, the endorsement controls."
Steuart Petroleum Co. v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's London, 696 So.2d 376, 379 (Fla. 1st
Dist.Ct.App.1997).
*6 With these principles in mind, the Court now
turns to the parties' arguments.

B. Continental Was Not Prejudiced by Late Notice of Keenan's Claim.
One of the arguments raised by Continental which
would potentially be dispositive of the entire case is
that Keenan's claims under the Policy are barred because Keenan did not provide timely notice to Continental of those claims, as required by the terms of
the Policy itself. In opposition to that argument,
Keenan contends that because Continental did not
comply with certain Florida statutory requirements,
it is precluded from asserting the defense. Keenan
also argues that the late-notice defense fails because Continental was not prejudiced by the late
notice. The Court agrees that Continental's notice
argument is without merit.
[3][4] Under Florida law, an insured's failure to
comply with a mandatory contractual provision requiring it to provide written notice to the insurer of
a claim "as soon as practicable" may negate an insurer's coverage obligation, but only if the insurer is
actually prejudiced by the late notice. Tiedtke v.
Fid. & Cas. Co. of New York, 222 So.2d 206, 209
(Fla. 1969). Further, an insurer is ordinarily presumed to be prejudiced if the insured provides late
notice of a claim in violation of the provisions of
the insurance agreement. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Marias, 475 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 1985). The insured,
however, can rebut that presumption by introducing
evidence tending to show that the insurer was in
fact not prejudiced by the late notice of the claim.
Id. Florida courts have uniformly held that where
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an insured possesses enough information to permit
it to deny the claim on other grounds (and it actually did deny the claim on other grounds), it waives
its right to object to coverage on the basis that the
insured failed to provide timely notice of the claim.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beville, 825 So.2d
999, 1004 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.2002); Wegener v.
Int'l Bankers Ins. Co., 494 So.2d 259, 259 (Fla.3d
Dist.Ct.App.1986); Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Phelps, 294 So.2d 362, 365 (Fla. 1st
Dist.Ct.App.1974).
[5] In the present case, regardless of whether Continental was required to comply with the statutory
guidelines for asserting a late-notice defense, FNI
the record reflects that Continental denied coverage-some ten months after receiving notice of the
claim-premised not upon the late notice or any resulting detrimental effect on its ability to investigate
the claim, but upon Continental's interpretation and
application of the terms of the contract itself. As
the Florida Court of Appeals has also concluded
under similar circumstances, this Court "cannot
conceive that [the defendant] would not have also
denied liability on these same grounds had the notice been timely." Phelps, 294 So.2d at 365. The
fact that Continental was able to investigate the
claim sufficiently to permit it to deny the claim on
other grounds effectively rebuts any presumption of
prejudice arising from the late notice. Consequently, Continental has not established that it is
entitled to summary judgment on that basis.

C. The "Other Insurance" Endorsement
*7 The next argument the Court will consider is
Continental's contention that the "other insurance"
endorsement in the Policy relieves it of any obligation to indemnify either Zurich or Travelers, whose
policies provided primary coverage, thereby substantially reducing its liability in this case. In addition, Continental argues that the "other insurance"
endorsement clearly provides that Continental shall
have no duty to defend any suit or claim that another insurer has a duty to defend. (Continental Policy

at 24.) As discussed below, the Court agrees that
the Zurich and Travelers Policies, by their clear
terms, provide primary coverage, while the Continental Policy only provides excess "other insurance"
coverage. Accordingly, the Court will grant partial
summary judgment in favor of Continental on the
issue of whether the Continental Policy provided
excess rather than primary coverage, thereby substantially limiting Keenan's potential recovery in
this case.
[6][7] To determine whether a policy provides for
primary or excess coverage, Florida law requires
that courts measure the intent of the parties "solely
by the language of the policies unless the language
is ambiguous." Towne Realty, Inc. v. Safeco Ins.
Co., 854 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir.1988). A policy
may contain language indicating that it is intended
to provide primary coverage unless other insurance
exists that also provides primary coverage and insures the same loss, in which case the first policy
will only provide "excess" coverage after exhaustion of the limits of the second policy. However,
where two or more policies that apparently cover
the same loss both contain excess "other insurance"
provisions, the clauses are deemed "mutually repugnant." American Cas. Co. v. Health Care Indent., Inc.,
613
F.Supp.2d
1310,
1319
(M.D.Fla.2009). In such situations, "each insurer is
then liable for a pro-rata share of the settlement or
judgment" in accordance with its policy limits.
Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
386 F.Supp.2d 1272, 1278 (S.D.Fla.2005).
[8] The Continental Policy at issue here contains an
unambiguous "other insurance" endorsement, as
follows:
THE PROVISIONS UNDER CONDITION 4.
OTHER INSURANCE ARE DELETED IN
TOTAL AND REPLACED BY THE FOLLOWING:
F OTHER VALID AND COLLECTIBLE INSURANCE IS AVAILABLE TO THE INSURED
FOR A LOSS WE COVER UNDER COVER-
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AGES A OR B OF THIS COVERAGE PART,
THIS INSURANCE IS EXCESS OVER ANY
OF THE OTHER INSURANCE, WHETHER
PRIMARY, EXCESS, CONTINGENT, OR ON
ANY OTHER BASIS.
•VHEN THIS INSURANCE IS EXCESS, WE
WILL HAVE NO DUTY UNDER COVERAGE A OR B TO DEFEND ANY CLAIM OR
"SUIT' THAT ANY OTHER INSURER HAS
A DUTY TO DEFEND....
tfHEN THIS INSURANCE IS EXCESS OVER
OTHER INSURANCE, WE WILL PAY
ONLY OUR SHARE OF THE AMOUNT OF
THE LOSS, IF ANY, THAT EXCEEDS THE
SUM OF:
[\) THE TOTAL AMOUNT THAT ALL SUCH
OTHER INSURANCE WOULD PAY FOR THE
LOSS IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS INSURANCE; AND
[2) THE TOTAL OF ALL DEDUCTIBLE AND
SELF-INSURED AMOUNTS UNDER ALL
THAT OTHER INSURANCE.
*8 (Continental Policy at 24.)
In contrast, the Zurich Policy's "other insurance"
provision states, in pertinent part:
[f other valid and collectible insurance is available
to the insured for a loss we cover under Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our obligations are limited as follows:
a. Primary Insurance
rhis insurance is primary except when b. below applies. If this insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected unless any of the other insurance is also primary. Then we will share
with all that other insurance by the method described in c. below.

rhis insurance is excess over any of the other insurance, whether primary, excess, contingent or on
any other basis:
1. That is Fire, Extended Coverage, Builder's Risk,
Installation Risk or similar coverage for "your
work;"
2. That is "Specific Perils" insurance for premises
rented to you; or
3. If the loss arises out of the maintenance or use of
aircraft, "autos" or watercraft to the extent not
subject to Exclusion g. of Coverage A (Section I).
When this insurance is excess, we will have no duty
under Coverage A or B to defend any claim or
"suit" that any other insurer has a duty to defend ....
(Zurich Policy at 18.)
The Travelers Policy's "other insurance" provision
is identical to the Zurich Policy's, except that it
identifies slightly different situations where the
policy will be considered excess, none of which is
applicable here. (Travelers Policy at 33.) In addition, the Zurich and Travelers Policies' "other insurance" provisions are identical to the Continental
Policy's unamended and inoperative "other insurance" provision (superseded by the Endorsement),
except that it too enumerated slightly different situations in which the policy would be considered excess. (Continental Policy at 55.)
The Court finds that the "other insurance" provision
in the Continental Policy unambiguously relieves
Continental from any duty to indemnify Keenan for
a covered loss until all primary insurance coverage
is exhausted, or to defend it against a lawsuit when
other insurers have a primary duty to defend. In
contrast, the "other insurance" provisions in the
Zurich and Travelers Policies recognize that these
policies, respectively, provide primary coverage except in a limited number of specific circumstances,
none of which is applicable in this case. Con-

b. Excess Insurance
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sequently, the insurance policies at issue are not
"mutually repugnant." Am. Cas. Co., 613 F.Supp.2d
at 1319. With Zurich and Travelers providing
primary coverage, the Continental Policy provides
excess coverage only. Continentals' duty to defend
and indemnify is therefore "consecutive to, rather
than concurrent with," Zurich's and Travelers' duties as primary insurers. Nat'l Union Fire, 214 F.3d
at 1273. There is no dispute that the Zurich Policy
and the Travelers Policy each provided coverage up
to $2,000,000 for "property damage" claims, for a
total of $4,000,000, and that Zurich and Travelers
did in fact cover the subject loss and provide a defense in the Underlying Case. The other insurers'
payments in this case, including defense costs
(approximately $1,215,251) and settlement costs
(approximately $1,195,000) totaled approximately
$2,410,251-less than Zurich's and Travelers' combined policy limits. Because the primary insurers'
coverage limits were apparently not exhausted,
Continental has no legal duty to reimburse those insurers for the amounts they spent in defending and
indemnifying Keenan in the Underlying Case.
*9 Keenan attempts to avoid this result by arguing,
based on Appleman on Insurance, that an "other insurance" clause in the Continental Policy will be effective only if the clause "refers to the existence of
other insurers that insure the 'same risk, for the benefit of the same [entityf, during the same period
of time.' " (Doc. No. 124, at 4 (quoting 23-145 Appleman on Insurance § 145.4[C] ).) Keenan further
argues that because Continental's endorsement
"only deals with losses covered under its policy
period, and because there are no other concurrent
primary policies, the endorsement is inapplicable to
the subject loss." (Doc. No. 124, at 4.) This argument is unavailing. The endorsement at issue does
not concern the policy periods covered by the other
insurance and is not dependent upon whether the
policies are "concurrent." Rather, by its terms, the
Continental Policy states that "if other valid and
collectible insurance is available to the insured for
a loss we cover ..., this insurance is excess over any
other of the other insurance...." (Continental Policy

at 24.) There is no dispute here that Keenan had
"other valid and collectible insurance" "available"
to it, of which in fact it availed itself. The fact that
the policy periods themselves were not overlapping
is therefore of no moment.
In sum, Continental is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law on the question of whether its
Policy provided excess insurance based on the existence of other primary insurance available to
Keenan. That determination, in and of itself, will
have the effect of reducing Continental's potential
liability to only that sum paid out of pocket by
Keenan, which Continental apparently concedes for
purposes of its motion to be $292,480. (Doc No.
124 at 12.) Of that sum, however, it is not clear
how much would actually be payable by Continental even if no other bases existed for reducing its potential liability, because the record before the Court
does not reveal why Keenan was required to pay
any amount out of pocket in the first place. If it was
because of the other policies' deductibles, the exclusionary language "other insurance" endorsement
quoted above suggests that Continental is only required to pay the amount of the insured's loss that
"exceeds the sum of ... the total of all deductible
and self-insured amounts under ... other insurance."
(Continental Policy at 24.) In addition. Continental
would not be required to reimburse Keenan for
damages arising from losses that were not covered
by the terms of the Continental Policy, such as
damages relating to Keenan's own defective work
product, as opposed to other property damage
caused by Keenan's work. As discussed below,
however, these gaps in the factual record are immaterial, because Continental is entitled to judgment
in its favor on other grounds as to the remaining sum.

D. The "Duty to Defend" Endorsement
Separate and apart from the "other insurance" endorsement pursuant to which Continental has no
duty to defend when the Continental Policy is excess over other collectible insurance, Continental
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further argues that it had no duty to defend under
the clear terms of the Policy and therefore no obligation to reimburse Keenan for any amounts it paid
out toward attorneys' fees or litigation costs. The
Court agrees that the policy language unequivocally
rejects any such duty.
*10 [9][10] Under Florida law, the duty to indemnify is separate and distinct from the duty to defend.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. RJT Enters., 692 So.2d 142, 144
(Fla.1997). Thus, as the Florida Supreme Court has
recognized, "in the absence of an express statutory
or contractual duty to defend, there is no such
duty." Id. In the present case, neither party has
pointed this Court to any statutory provision that
might have bearing on the issue. Further, while
Keenan argues generally that the duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify, that fact is only
relevant if the insurer actually has an obligation to
defend. Although the coverage portion of the Policy
references a duty to defend (Continental Policy at
47), Continental relies upon a superseding endorsement which states, in pertinent part:
5.

THOSE PROVISIONS IN THE POLICY
WHICH IMPOSE A DUTY ... TO DEFEND
ANY SUIT SEEKING DAMAGES COVERED
UNDER THE POLICY AND OBLIGATE U.S.
TO PAY 'SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS'
FN2
ARE HEREBY DELETED FROM THE
POLICY.

5. WE HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO PAY OR
CONTRIBUTE TO ANY ALLOCATED LOSS
ADJUSTMENT EXPENSES. RATHER, YOU
WILL PAY ALL SUCH EXPENSES UNDER
ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.
FURTHER, ALLOCATED LOSS ADJUSTMENT EXPENSES WILL NOT BE APPLIED
TO THE OCCURRENCE OR AGGREGATE
DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNT.
ALLOCATION CLAIM EXPENSES SHALL
INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, ALL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AND COURT

COSTS, FEES AND EXPENSES, FEES FOR
SERVICES OF PROCESS, FEES TO ATTORNEYS, ... FEES OR COST FOR EXPERTS,
COST OF COPIES OF TRANSCRIPTS OF
TESTIMONY AT ... CRIMINAL OR CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS, ... COST OF DEPOSITIONS
AND COURT REPORTS OR RECORDED
STATEMENTS AND ANY SIMILAR COSTS
OR EPXENSES PROPERLY CHARGEABLE
TO THE INVESTIGATION OR DEFENSE OF
A PARTICULAR CLAIM, OR TO PROTECT
YOUR RIGHT OF SUBROGATION.
(Continental Policy at 10-11, 29-30.FN3)
In ruling on this motion for summary judgment, the
Court must, of course, draw all reasonable inferences from the available evidence in the light most
favorable to Keenan as the non-moving party. Arlington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 871 (11th
Cir.1998). Unfortunately for Keenan, the language
of the provision set forth above contains no ambiguity that could be resolved in Keenan's favor. The
Court finds as a matter of law that Continental had
no duty to defend Keenan under the unambiguous
terms of the insurance contract, and Continental is
entitled to summary judgment in its favor on that
issue. This conclusion means that Continental has
no liability for the $122,980 Keenan paid from its
own funds toward legal fees and litigation costs.

E. The Applicable Deductible
[11] The Court has determined that Continental had
no obligation under the Policy to provide Keenan
with a defense in the Underlying Case, and, as excess insurer, has no obligation to indemnify Zurich
or Travelers for any sums they expended, as
primary insurers, in the Underlying Case. Accordingly, the only expenditure remaining in dispute at
this point is the $169,500 Keenan paid from its own
pocket toward the settlement with Bovis. Continental argues that, because the applicable deductible
is $250,000, it has no liability for any portion of
that amount. Keenan argues that the deductible was
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set at $50,000 by a subsequent endorsement for
which it paid additional consideration.
*11 There are two "Deductible Endorsements" included in the Policy. The first, setting the deductible at $250,000, went into effect as of the effective
date of the Policy, or February 1, 2000.
(Continental Policy at 29, 30.) A later endorsement
that went into effect on July 1, 2000 set the deductible amount at $50,000. (Continental Policy at 10,
11.) In other words, these endorsements, considered
together, are neither ambiguous nor inconsistent;
instead, the question of which applies depends upon
the effective date of a covered claim. Neither party
addresses that question, though Continental asserts
conclusorily that "the date of loss is prior to the
change in deductible" (Doc. No. 124, at 8), while
Keenan asserts, in an equally conclusory fashion,
that Continental "was not asked to defend this case
until well after" the $50,000 deductible endorsement went into effect. (Doc. No. 113, at 24.)
The Continental Policy, by its terms, covers
"property damage," defined as "[p]hysical injury to
tangible property," that "occurs during the policy
period." (Continental Policy at 59, 47.) Clearly, the
damage to Disney's Boardwalk Project "occurred"
well before 2000, but the Policy contains a "known
and continuing loss endorsement" pursuant to
which the Policy also covers damage which first
"manifests" during the policy term:
All claims or suits for ... "property damage" that is
continuous or progressively deteriorating and
which "manifest" during this policy period will
be deemed to apply only to this policy period and
no other policy period.

4

Manifest(ed)" means...

... For "property damage" when the damage is first
discovered by the person or organization who
suffered such damage.

As previously suggested, it appears that Keenan
seeks coverage from Continental under the 2000
Policy based on a theory that Disney, the
"organization who suffered such damage," first discovered the damage in 2000. Disney instituted the
Underlying Case against Bovis to recover for the
same damages as those at issue in this suit on June
9, 2000; thus, it obviously must have "discovered"
the subject damage of the suit at some point prior to
that date. Keenan, in support of its argument that
the lesser deductible applies, asserts only that Continental "was not asked to defend this case until
well after" the $50,000 Deductible Endorsement
went into effect. That argument has no merit, in
part because Continental was not asked to defend
this case until well after the 2000 Policy had expired, so the date upon which a demand for indemnification is made obviously cannot be deemed to
control resolution of the question of which deductible applies.
Moreover, under the plain language of the policy,
Continental's liability on the contract, if any, accrued when Disney discovered the Property Damage, in this case no later than the date Disney filed
suit. Since the $50,000 Deductible Endorsement, by
its own terms, was not "effective" until July 1,
2000, then, under a plain reading of the contract, it
is the original $250,000 deductible which applies.
As noted by Couch on Insurance:
*12 It is important to consider all endorsements and
riders before drawing any conclusions as to the
effect of a special or general provision. The date
the endorsement or rider was issued determines
not only the nature of the coverage but also
defines the period of coverage under its terms.
For example, while an endorsement might add
coverage of a particular type of risk, there is still
no coverage if the loss from such a risk occurred
before the effective date of the endorsements.
Couch on Insurance § 22:2.
Because the Deductible Endorsement only applies
as of its effective date, it is logical, and necessary,

(Continental Policy at 46 (emphasis added).)
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to construe the Policy to require application of the
deductible that was in effect on the latest date Disney could have discovered the Property Damage.
Simply put, because Disney had knowledge of the
property damage prior to the July 1, 2000 effective
date of the $50,000 Deductible Endorsement, that
endorsement does not apply. Instead, if the losses
are covered by the 2000 Policy at all, then the
$250,000 deductible must govern. Keenan does not
and could not legitimately argue that there exists
some ambiguity in the Policy that should be construed in its favor The Court cannot discern any
contractual basis for applying the $50,000 deductible. Any liability Continental may otherwise have
had for the $169,500 Keenan paid in indemnity is
therefore entirely obviated by the deductible for
which Keenan is responsible under the Policy.

F. Application of the "Known and Continuing
Loss" Policy Endorsement
Another argument raised by Continental which, by
itself, is potentially dispositive of the entire case is
based upon the "known loss" provision in the
Policy, referenced above, and alternatively upon a
common-law known-loss doctrine. Because the
Court finds that the express provision of the contract is controlling, there is no need to address the
common-law argument™
The "known and loss" endorsement states in relevant part:
This insurance does not apply to and we have no
duty to defend any claim or "suit" seeking damages because of "bodily injury" or "property
damage" that is continuous or progressively deteriorating and which "manifested" prior to the
inception or after the expiration of the policy
period;
(Continental Policy at 46 (emphasis added).). Thus,
the relevant question, for purposes of determining
whether this endorsement precludes coverage, is
when did Disney, as the "person or organization

who suffered such damage," become aware of property damage that was the subject of the Underlying
Case and is likewise the subject of Keenan's claim
for damages against Continental.
Continental argues that it has no liability at all for
the damages sought by Keenan, because Disney became aware of the existence of the property damage
caused by Keenan no later than 1997, years before
Continental contracted with Keenan to provide insurance coverage. Specifically, Continental points
to two types of "property damage" caused by Keenan's work that were discovered by Disney prior to
the inception of any Continental policy covering
Keenan: (1) paint failures resulting from defective
woodwork installed by Keenan, and (2) water intrusion caused by other defective work performed by
Keenan. Keenan, in response, argues that while
Disney knew about problems with Keenan's work
product itself prior to 2000, there is at least a disputed issue of fact as to when Disney learned of
"property damage" covered by the Policy.

1. Disney knew that Keenan's defective wood
caused Lyle Painting's paint to fail prior to the
policy period.
*13 [12] As a preliminary matter, there appears to
be no dispute now that Keenan's (or its subcontractors') work did in fact cause "property damage" on
Disney's project site. The record shows that Lyle
Painting, and not Keenan, was in charge of painting
some of the wood trim that Keenan was responsible
for installing. The poor quality of the wood used by
Keenan for various trim on the project caused paint
failures for Lyle Painting, which in turn caused
delays in the overall construction project. Because
these paint failures occurred on an aspect of the
construction project that was outside the scope of
the work assigned to Keenan, they constitute
"property damage" under the terms of the contract.
The presence of "property damage" alone, however,
is not sufficient to trigger the "known-loss" provisions. Disney must also have "discovered" the
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"property damage" before Continental's Policy
went into effect on February 1, 2000. As a matter of
contract interpretation, and contrary to Keenan's
implicit assumption, the Continental Policy does
not apparently require that Disney attribute the loss
in question to Keenan or its subcontractors, or even
that it recognize the damage in question as
"property damage" falling within the Policy's definition of that term. Rather, the Policy itself requires
only that Disney, as the party who suffered the
damage, "discover" the damage within the Policy
period.
The evidence in the record unequivocally establishes that Disney knew of property damage to the
painting performed by Lyle Painting caused by
Keenan or its subcontractors no later than 1997. In
that regard, the record contains a Memorandum
from Charlie Hardiman of Disney cataloguing various problems with the work at the project site,
which specifically includes the following reference:
"Paint defects: The sap or something is bleeding
through due to inadequate sealing of the wood before the paint was applied. Unfortunately, the resolution has been to put fresh paint over it. We need to
fix the problem not cover it. Additionally, we are
finding "alligatoring" of paint on numerous shutters." (Doc. No. 91-11, at 2.) The record contains a
second Memorandum from Charlie Hardiman of
Disney dated May 22, 1997 identifying the same issues (paint "alligatoring" and sap bleed). (Doc. No.
91-18, at 1.) These problems were eventually attributed to problems with the wood installed by Keenan
or its subcontractors rather than to problems with
the paint job per se. Thus, the record establishes
that Disney was aware no later than 1997 of problems with the paint that were caused by underlying
problems with the wood for which Keenan was responsible. The question of whether Disney was actually aware that Keenan was responsible for the
underlying problems is not material.

2. Disney knew that Keenan's failure to adequately perform its work resulted in "property
damage" through water intrusion.

Another instance of "property damage" caused by
Keenan's work is documented in a 1995 letter from
Disney to Bovis regarding water intrusion. In this
letter, Disney explicitly stated that it was concerned
that Keenan's "coordination" and "manpower"
problems were delaying Bovis' completion of the
roof and exterior facades, thereby allowing rain water to soak into and damage several portions of the
project site. There is no dispute that the damage at
issue was "property damage," since Keenan, pursuant to its subcontract with Bovis, was responsible
for all "exterior wall and roof (Doc. No. 91-4, at
11), and Keenan's alleged failure to adequately perform that work directly contributed to water intrusion in the "drywall, in-wall insulation, and wall
finishes." (Doc. 91-9, 10/11/1995 Letter from Disney to Bovis ("In the last few months we have continuously discussed problems related to water intrusion in the Hotel and DVS guestroom buildings.
The source of these problems is directly tied to
completion of the roofs and exterior facades.").)
Even more importantly, Disney's 1995 letter clearly
confirms that Disney knew of this "property damage" well before the Continental insurance policy
period began in the year 2000.
*14 Keenan argues, however, that the letter does
not conclusively establish that Disney believed that
Keenan was responsible for water intrusion, either
through faulty or delayed construction. Instead,
Keenan contends that Disney was referring to a
separate roofing sub-contractor as being responsible
for the water intrusion at issue. Upon further scrutiny, however, Keenan's attempt to favorably characterize Disney's 1995 letter falls flat. Disney's letter did not solely attribute the roofing delay to one
sub-contractor. It referred to a continued lack of
"coordination" with Bovis as the problem that all
the sub-contractors mentioned in the letter, including Keenan, shared in common. In addition,
however, the letter explicitly singled out "Keenan"
as one of the sub-contractors who could not timely
complete the roofing due to a lack of manpower. (
Id.) Finally, as set forth above, Disney's
"discovery" of the property damage under the
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Policy exclusion does not, on its face, require that it
attribute the damage to Keenan

Continental's liability under the 2000 Policy

There simply does not seem to be room for reasonable minds to differ on the possible inferences
arising from the facts presented in the record An
derson, All U S at 248 Disney knew that the inability of Keenan and other sub contractors to coordinate and muster sufficient manpower to finish
constructing the roof and exterior facades was the
source of the water intrusion problems, and Keenan
has not adequately supported its assertion that a
separate roofing sub-contractor was at fault for the
water intrusion problem In sum, there is no material issue of disputed fact as to whether Disney
"discovered" the property damage / e water intrusion, caused by Keenan's work prior to the inception of the policy

V. CONCLUSION

3. The Import of Disney's Knowledge of Property Damage Caused by Keenan's Work
In addition to the above referenced documentation,
the Close-Out Change Order dated August 1997
further documents Disney's knowledge of the problems that would later give rise to the 2000 Underlying Case, and m that document Disney specifically
reserved its claims related to the above-referenced
defects In sum, Continental has produced evidence
documenting the requisite knowledge on the part of
Disney, while Keenan has not pointed to any countervailing evidence in the record that would create a
material question of fact as to whether Disney had
discovered all of the relevant property damage prior
to the inception of the 2000 Policy The Continental
Policy expressly excludes coverage of property
damage that manifested prior to the inception of the
Policy Keenan does not contend that there are other types of covered property damage (other than the
paint issues and water intrusion) that did not manifest until sometime during the first half of 2000 (or
later) Consequently, the Court can only presume
that all the property damage at issue manifested prior to the inception of the Policy This conclusion
alone is sufficient to dispose of the question of

*15 As set forth above, the Court has determined
that
(1) The "other insurance" endorsement relieves
Continental from any liability for amounts paid by
Keenan's primary insurers, and limits any potential
recovery by Keenan against Continental for monies
that Keenan paid out of pocket to only those
amounts which are covered by the terms of the
Continental Policy and properly payable m indemnity by Continental under the "other insurance" endorsement,
(2) The "duty to defend" waiver relieves Continental from any liability for those amounts spent by
Keenan or its pnmary insurers m defending Keenan
in the Underlying Case, and
(3) The $250,000 Deductible Endorsement is applicable because the claims in this case, assuming
they are covered by the 2000 Policy at all, matured
no later than June 9, 2000, the date Disney initiated
the Underlying Case
Together, these three determinations lead inexorably to a conclusion that Continental is entitled to
judgment in its favor as a matter of law as to all
damages sought by Keenan in this case The Court
also makes an alternative finding, however, that the
"known-loss" endorsement in the Policy relieves
Continental from any liability for any amounts
arising out of the "property damage" of which Disney was aware prior to 2000, before the inception
of any policy of insurance issued by Continental to
Keenan It appears that all the property damage at
issue manifested prior to the Policy's inception On
this basis as well, Continental is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law
An appropriate order granting Continental's motion
for summary judgment and dismissing this case in
its entirety will enter
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FNl. Keenan also argues that, in order for
an insurer to assert a coverage defense
based upon late notice by the insured, the
insurer generally must meet certain requirements set out in the Claims Administration Statute, Fla. Stat. § 627.426. See
Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Salvia, 472 So.2d
486, 488 (Fla. 5th Dist.Ct.App.1985)
(noting that, under the statute, certain coverage defenses are barred unless the insurer exercises compliance with the statute). However, under Florida law, the
Claims Administration Statute does not apply to excess insurers. Lazzara Oil Co. v.
Columbia Gas Co., 683 F.Supp. 777, 782
(M.D.Fla.1988). Thus, while failure to
strictly comply with the statute will result
in estoppel of the claim if the insurer was
liable for coverage, it will not result in estoppel when liability for the claim does not
otherwise exist. Country Manors Ass'n. v.
Master Antenna Sys., 534 So.2d 1187 (Fla.
4th Dist.Ct.App.1988). In this case, as discussed more fully below, the Policy unambiguously provides excess coverage.
FN2.
"Supplementary
payments"
are
defined in the Policy as expenses incurred
by Continental, or incurred by the insured
at Continental's request, to assist in the investigation or defense of the claim or suit,
costs taxed against an insured in a lawsuit,
interest on a judgment, and other litigationrelated expenditures. (Continental Policy at
52.) In other words, "supplementary payments" are a component of defense costs,
and are therefore only incurred in conjunction with paying the costs of defending the
insured against a claim or lawsuit.

Endorsement.
FN4. Cf. Gencor Indus., Inc. v. Wausau
Underwriters Ins. Co., 857 F.Supp. 1560,
1566 n. 9 (M.D.Fla.1994) (noting that it
had no need to address the defendant's argument regarding a common law "known
loss" doctrine in light of the court's ability
to resolve the dispute on other grounds).
This Court also observes that Continental
has not referenced a single Florida case
that actually recognizes the doctrine. In
light of that fact, and given that insurance
law in Florida is tightly controlled by the
interplay between statutes and contracts, it
seems unlikely that Florida courts would
recognize such a common-law doctrine.
The applicable statute, in fact, is Fla. Stat.
§ 627.409, which lays out the circumstances in which a misrepresentation,
omission or concealment of fact by an insured in the course of applying or negotiating for any insurance contract may prevent
recovery under the policy. Continental
raises an argument under that statute in
connection with its "known loss" defense,
but the argument is perfunctory at best. For
purposes of the motion for summary judgment, there is clearly a question of fact as
to whether Keenan omitted, concealed or
misrepresented any fact it was asked or required to disclose.
M.D.Fla.,2009.
Keenan Hopkins Schmidt And Stowell Contractors,
Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co.
— F.Supp.2d — , 2009 WL 2868627 (M.D.Fla.)
END OF DOCUMENT

FN3. The provision negating any otherwise
existing duty to defend is located under the
Deductible Endorsement, and is worded
identically in both the $50,000 Deductible
Endorsement and the $250,000 Deductible
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